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came necessary to replace the caveman's club as a means of enforcing
obedience and respect.8
And on occasion he slips into such pedantic generalizations as:
The idea that obedience to divine commands was good and disobedience
sinful has been traced to the assertions of the early popes, as well as the
emperors. It was probably not new with them.0
And it is unfortunate that the book, published before the Supreme Court's
recent decision involving Governor Barnett,10 was not able to deal in any
detail with that decision. Goldfarb does, however, discuss the right to trial
by jury in contempt cases generally and, in a postscript, briefly analyzes the
special considerations involved in the Barnett case.
All in all, though, it is quite an impressive book. Hopefully it will stimulate
reform in this troublesome area of the law.
JUDGE BAILEY BROWNt
LAW, LIBERTY AND PsYcHIATRY. By Thomas S. Szasz, M.D.* New York:
The MacMillan Company, Pp. 281. $7.50.
T E evil that men do certainly lives after them; indeed, it often shows a
disagreeable tendency to live with them and follow them about. In approaching
the task of reviewing a book by Thomas Szasz, already author of an earlier
tendentious and wildly misleading exposition entitled The Myth of Mental
Illness,' a British psychiatrist is bound to experience a certain advance preju-
dice. Recognizing this, he must in honesty acknowledge it. The Myth of Mental
Illness probably deserved no more than it got from most British reviewers,
whose medical education and eclectic psychiatric background equipped them
to point out that a doctor who could seriously maintain that mental illness was
a myth was a doctor whose medical education and experience must have left
a good deal to be desired.
But there was no reason why reviews of this kind should have deterred Dr.
Szasz, prominent member of the editorial board of the Journal of Nervous and
Mental Disease, and of the board of consultants of Psychoanalysis and thc
Psychoanalytic Review, from launching a further literary and professional
bombshell in the general direction of the reliance of the American legal system
upon the sociologic and psychoanalytic concepts of psychiatry. This is, in fact,
his third book, as listed by his publishers, the first being Pain and Pleasure,2
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published in 1957, which contained thoughtful intimations of its author's mis-
trust of psychophysical concepts; the second was the notorious Myth of Men-
tal Illness, which proved of little weight or comfort to any informed reader in
the United Kingdom, apart from a few well-known drum beaters like Lady
Barbara Wooton, who could not have been expected to know which part of
its medical premises were true and which were false. The author still espouses
this cause, and in the second paragraph of his preface announces with an as-
surance which seems not to need even the aplomb with which it is made:
"Psychiatric activity is medical in name only ... psychiatry is a form of social
engineering. It should be recognized as such."3 Later in the same preface he
announces that the book is addressed not only to lawyers, psychiatrists and
social scientists, but also to the intelligent layman. "Indeed, the last may find
it especially useful, for organized psychiatry poses a much greater threat to
him than it does for the professionals." 4 The threat would be less grave, per-
haps, if some of the professionals were better trained, notably Dr. Szasz him-
self. The expressed aims of the book are two-fold: first, to present a critical
inquiry into current social and especially legal uses of psychiatry; second, to
offer a reasoned dissent from what the author considers the theory and practice
of false psychiatric liberalism. Most of the legal and social applications of psy-
chiatry, undertaken in the name of psychiatric liberalism, are in his opinion,
instances of despotism, a despotism nonetheless coercive because it is based on
what are presumed to be health values. "Just as in democracy there lurks the
danger of tyranny by the majority, so in mental-health legislation there lurks
the danger of tyranny by therapy."r,
In the early pages of the book itself Dr. Szasz points out that modem psy-
chiatry was born a few years after the founding of the United States of
America. He dates it from May 24th, 1798, when Philippe Pinel removed the
chains from one of the most feared patients at the Bicetre, the Paris asylum
for male lunatics. "Thus," continues the author, "the historical paradigm of
psychiatric treatment is neither prescribing medicines nor performing opera-
tions, but giving an imprisoned human being a measure of freedom."0 Before
pursuing this interesting and by no means insignificant argument further, we
are entitled, even bound, to take a cool, hard look at the basis of some of Dr.
Szasz's fundamental assumptions.
The first, and most characteristically fallacious of all of them, is the con-
stantly implied equation of psychiatry with psychoanalysis, and vice versa.
This recurs repeatedly throughout the book, and would suggest that Dr. Szasz
remains either invincibly ignorant of, or disdainfully uninterested in biochem-
ical hypotheses concerning, for example, the nature of schizophrenia, and com-
pletely indifferent to the possibilities and responsibilities of diagnosis, prog-
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lacy here is the fallacy which was central to The Myth of Mental Illness. It
remains central to this book, but is no longer essential. There is hereby created
the interesting paradox that a great deal of what Dr. Szasz has to say on the
subject of liberty, responsibility, and the conjoint and historical errors of psy-
chiatry and the law in certain notable cases, remains true - despite the
appallingly impoverished appreciation which he has of the nature of psy-
chiatry itself. But there are areas of the book where the central fallacy of
its predecessor does bring its current assumptions, and the logic based upon
them, crumbling to the ground; and these must receive as much attention in
what is certainly intended to be a fair and objective review, as the praise and
acceptance of what remains forthright and sound.
Dr. Szasz scatters a number of subsidiary fallacies in his opening passages.
We are informed that there is a "persistent confusion between two distinct
psychiatric roles - namely, the psychiatrist as an analyzer of life-games and
meanings, and as a giver of games and meanings."7 He goes on to say, "This
distinction is displayed in two ways. One is the posture of the psychiatrist
offering his wares - call it analysis, help, therapy, or what not - to self-
responsible, adult buyers. The other is the posture of the psychiatrist coercing
others, with police power if necessary, to submit themselves to his control .... ."
The fact that neither of these two roles corresponds to what any reputable
psychiatrist actually does, together with an apparently related failure to recog-
nize, perhaps even to comprehend, that a great deal of psychiatric work is in
fact a combination of medical techniques with sensitively humane and imagina-
tive relationships, once again undermines the whole of the author's approach
to his thesis, while periodically threatening to turn it into almost pure non-
sense.
By page 11 he is ready to go back to redeveloping his own concept of The
Myth. He refers to his earlier book with evident satisfaction, quite clearly un-
impressed by any of the cogent and unanswered criticisms which it received.
His sole concession to the reality of mental illness is to remark that "The
notion ... derives its main support from such phenomena as syphilis of the
brain or delirious conditions - intoxications, for instance - in which persons
may manifest certain disorders of thinking and behavior."0 He continues, "Cor-
rectly speaking, however, these are diseases of the brain, not of the mind.
According to one school of thought, all so-called mental illness is of this
type .... Many contemporary psychiatrists, physicians, and other scientists
hold this view, which implies that people's troubles cannot be caused by con-
flicting personal needs, opinions, social aspirations, values, and so forth."10
No single statement in the whole book could better illustrate the extravagantly
irresponsible and preposterously illogical assumptions to which the author is
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potentially challenging exposition, it must be firmly stated that while many
psychiatrists, with extremely solid grounds of clinical and laboratory evidence
to support them, certainly do consider that disturbances of function and struc-
ture in the brain and nervous system are responsible for a significant propor-
tion of all mental illness, there could scarcely be a greater fallacy than to sup-
pose that this view implies that varieties of life stress, including conflicting per-
sonal needs, opinions, social aspirations, values, and so forth, are not also often
equally, sometimes even predominantly, important in the aetiology of mental
distress. The whole battle which psychiatry has been fighting for the last fifty
years, and which was dearly recognized by the founder of psychoanalysis him-
self, has been to proclaim and to secure acceptance for the concept of multiple
aetiology, not simply of psychiatric illness alone, but of all illness. What Dr.
Szasz says in this part of the book is in effect that such established concepts as
multiple aetiology, and the psychosomatic aspects of much of human sickness,
can be and must be totally ignored. In their place, he postulates a rigid either/
or hypothesis, useless to medicine, and in no way reflecting current psychiatric
thought: the archaic and by now totally obsolete hypothesis that human suffer-
ing is either physical or mental, organic or functional, and that if it is one it
cannot be the other. If this thesis were to be taken seriously, it alone would
set back the understanding of the human predicament, insofar as medicine in
general and psychiatry in particular have contributed to this understanding, by
at least fifty years.
Moreover, the effects of this confusion become immediately apparent in the
author's own development of his view. "In medical practice," he writes, "when
we speak of physical disturbances we mean either signs (for example, fever)
or symptoms (for example, pain) ... ."" This is precisely the kind of half-baked
conceptualisation of unrecognized philosophical and epistemological error which
the author is currently claiming to correct in the mind of the reader. Pain is
not a physical disturbance at all. Pain is a subjective sensation, which may or
may not arise from a structural lesion in the body. The reality of pain depends
upon one thing only: whether it is felt or not - whether, in fact, the person
who says he is experiencing the pain is telling the truth or deliberately lying.
To confuse the nature and reality of pain with the presence or absence of an
underlying structural basis is to commit one of the most grievous blunders of
which insensitivity and lack of imagination in medical practice are capable.
Moreover, the author's first book was concerned with this very area, and what-
ever else one may be driven to say about his thesis, Dr. Szasz gives no evidence
of being either insensitive or unimaginative. Once again we are forced to the
conclusion that in certain areas in which he is prepared to venture, he has
either not learned enough or else not continued to think enough about what he
should have learned.
One could belabor this aspect of the book indefinitely, but this would only
prove tedious. Nevertheless one further and final example of the author's corn-
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pulsive retreat from the foundations of basic psychiatric knowledge needs to
be instanced. He contrasts a defect in a patient's visual field with a delusion in
the area of his beliefs or a hallucination in the world of his experience. A
visual defect, as he correctly insists, may be explained by correlating it with
certain lesions in the nervous system. But he denies that delusions or hal-
lucinations can arise from disease of the nervous system. This is plain non-
sense. As such, it cannot help the foundation of his argument. But more im-
portant than this, it can and does imply a confusion within psychiatry for
which his own particular version of psychoanalytic background is presumably
responsible. Were it to be shared by all his colleagues, their summary and total
exclusion from participation as experts in any field of legal activity or the ad-
ministration of justice would be even more justified than his own relatively
modest and reasonable suggestions would imply.
As we read on, fresh fallacies loom in our path - some of them the mis-
leading re-statement of original historical truths, so that they become less than
half truths, and then by implication are rendered totally false. For example,
Charcot recognized that the majority of people disabled by certain character-
istic kinds of motor and sensory symptoms were in fact suffering from hysteria,
a disturbance of function at a level inaccessible to their own consciousness,
and were therefore to be distinguished from malingerers, that is people de-
liberately simulating illness in the full knowledge that they do not in fact suffer
from it. Dr. Szasz transforms this significant event in the history of medicine
into an alleged discovery which was not in fact a discovery at all. "Rather,"
he says, "it was a reclassification of malingerers as 'hysterics.' "12 From this he
pursues the logical course that "Changing the name of 'malingering' to 'hys-
teria' left untouched the basic rule that physicians could treat some disabilities
with kindness, others with hostility .... ."13 Once again, in his zeal to pursue
the thesis of his earlier book, Dr. Szasz retrospectively distorts history, and
incidentally denies precisely that gain of understanding in medicine for which
modem psychiatry has been largely responsible, for which it can take whatever
credit there may be in the alleviation of human misunderstanding and misery,
and in the further pursuit of which it is still of necessity actively engaged.
Most of the rest of the book is concerned with a lucid and reasoned exami-
nation of the operation of the law, and the intervention, sometimes admittedly
unhappy, of the psychiatrist. Let us turn to a consideration of these general
criticisms and constructive suggestions about the impact of the psychiatric
contribution upon the concept of Anglo-American justice.
He quotes a number of telling cases and reputable authorities; among others,
Overholser, Russell, Freud, Ferenczi and Judge Learned Hand. He examines
once again the battered logical imperfections of the McNaghten rules, with the
single original and somewhat surprising implication here that the jury is just





admittedly provide a decidedly rigid and unrealistic basis for approaching
this task. He gives a number of illuminating case histories, as examples of the
readiness of psychiatrists to provide a loophole for lawyers to dispose of awk-
ward cases by indeterminate sentences, either without trial or without the final
invocation of whatever punishment or settled sentence society might otherwise
oblige them to impose. The case of King Ludwig II of Bavaria is the first of
a fascinating stream of instances of this sort, and, indeed, one is not only be-
guiled by the author's obvious erudition and interest in this field, but forced
again to contrast it with certain aspects of his singular ignorance in his own
professional area.
He writes with admirable clarity and is never at a loss for the apt and telling
quotation. In addition to Judge Learned Hand, Mr. Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Mr. -Justice Frankfurter are also quoted. The evolution of the
Durham rule from the McNaghten rules, and the inescapable imperfections of
the former as derived from the latter, are reviewed. James Baldwin receives
attention, as does the case of Mrs. Isola Ware Curry, who stabbed the Rev-
erend Martin Luther King in a Harlem Department store and was then com-
mitted to the Matteawan State Hospital without being brought to trial.
Other vividly described and well documented case histories include that of
Jim Cooper, who, with the stated intention of getting himself executed, fired
nine shots into the body of his former fiancee, who had recently jilted him. He
had wanted to be killed since he was nine years old, when he believed he had
caused his father's death. His father had slipped on the ice running after his
son with a warm cap to wear to Hebrew school, and the fall proved fatal. Jim
Cooper never forgave himself for it. Between the ages of twelve and twenty-
three he committed many self-destructive acts, and, as Dr. Szasz observes,
"Perhaps it was an 'accident' that he lived long enough to kill Connie Gil-
man."14 Dr. Szasz's point can be exemplified by his approach to the tragic
climax of this case. Cooper was judged to be of unsound mind, and therefore
was not executed. When he finally realized that he was not going to be ex-
ecuted, he hanged himself in his cell. Dr. Szasz is contemptuous of the psy-
chiatric opinions offered, and even more of their outcome. "When the state
broke its contract, Cooper himself undertook to make it good. When, in effect,
the government said, 'although we have promised to kill you, we will not do
it,' Cooper replied, 'Then I will do it for you.' And he did."'1'
Now of course the point here is not whether Dr. Szasz or the psychiatrists
in the case were right. The question is whether or not there is such a thing
as unsoundness of mind which should prevent the execution of a man for
murder. Most people still believe that the concept of justice depends upon the
ancient Latin tag, Actus non facit reum visi sit inens rea. There cannot be a
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be sound. If it is unsound, then justice demands that guilt either be mitigated
or remain unproved.
All this, Dr. Szasz would like to sweep aside, but for the best possible
motives as far as his own concept of justice is concerned. He clearly does not
believe at all in the reality of psychotic illness - in the accepted sense. He
gives an example of a mythical individual who shoots several people in front
of the White House under the delusional belief that they are about to attack
the President. He says that many psychiatrists would be prepared to say that
such a man was suffering from schizophrenia, and therefore that he is not
responsible for his actions. Dr. Szasz says that schizophrenia was only a word
we use to explain abnormal behavior.10 For him it seems to have no other
meaning. The implication is that such a man should be imprisoned, and, utiless
he is discovered in fact to be acutely delirious or intoxicated, he must presum-
ably be treated exactly the same as anyone else who commits a deliberate pre-
meditated murder. If his action has occurred in a state where capital punish-
ment is part of the state code, then he must be executed. This may be a further
argument for the abolition of capital punishment, but it seems a somewhat
tenuous pretext for the abolition of the concept of unsoundness of mind in law.
Toward the end of the book, Dr. Szasz enunciates a number of long range
and short range goals. Long range goals include the abolition of involuntary
mental hospitalization, the abolition of the plea of insanity in criminal proceed-
ings, and the preservation of the human rights of the mental patient in a hos-
pital. The value of the first two of these procedures remain highly question-
able. Nevertheless it is extremely important that neither of them should be
abused, and Dr. Szasz has, albeit somewhat laboriously, performed a consid-
erable service by the degree of emphasis which he has given to this proposition.
The preservation of the human rights for the mental hospital patient is equally
desirable, although as propounded by Dr. Szasz it would encourage every
patient who had ever been in a mental hospital, and had subsequently disagreed
with the reasons which prompted his admission, to sue all concerned with his
care and treatment on the grounds of improper detention. One effect might be
that hospitals would be even more reluctant than some of them already are to
admit the litigious and paranoid patients who might nevertheless stand in need
of their care.
Right to the very end, Dr. Szasz mingles passages of compelling argument
with questionable assertions. Returning to the cases of Mrs. Isola Ware Curry
and Ezra Pound, both previously quoted and commented upon extensively,"
he says, "When, for instance, an outstanding antisegregationalist leader is
physically attacked by a Negro woman, her act is judged insane. When a
famous American poet embraces Fascism, and is charged with treason, he is
considered mentally ill and is imprisoned in a mental hospital. The examples
could be multiplied ... ,,18 They could be, and indeed they have been, but
16. P. 134.




surely the burning question is what are they examples of? Was Mrs. Isola
Ware Curry insane? Was Ezra Pound in fact a paranoid schizophrenic? If
they were not, if they were incorrectly diagnosed, and if the reason for these
incorrect diagnoses was psychiatric connivance in legal impropriety, then Dr.
Szasz does well to indict them both. But these examples and arguments do
not alter the validity of the concept of mental illness, nor of the concept of
justice whereby a man is presumed to be sane unless he is proved insane, but
wherein the reality of insanity is not totally denied, as it would be in the new
society created by Dr. Szasz's legal reforms.
Reflecting upon this book, a European reviewer is bound to wonder how
much the author's own European background and subsequent immigration,
with a clearly passionately loyal and sincere commitment to the United States,
has influenced what he has had to say and how he has chosen to say it. As
an intelligent, sensitive and ambitious professional man in contemporary
America Dr. Szasz is faced with a profound dilemma: on the one hand he is
inevitably moved to criticize that aspect of American life in which the state,
in the name of security, has permitted itself to encroach upon individual liber-
ty; on the other hand, he faces the enormous pressure to conform which no
citizen of the United States, least of all a first generation immigrant, can wholly
escape. Nor, if he is brave enough, and sufficiently alert, can he deny the cor-
rosive effects of this pressure upon his own self-respect, and his respect for his
adopted country. So, like the native born but naturally rebellious Mr. Norman
Mailer, he must oppose it.
But where Dr. Szasz would seem to differ from Mr. Mailer is that his rebel-
lion remains finally safe. It is conventionally unconventional. He has sensed
that liberty is in danger in America but he has chosen to attack the danger
from a false premise and from within the confines of an already ambivalent and
deeply divided camp, contemporary American psychiatry. However sincere,
his own psycho-analytically oriented belief that psychiatry should stay in the
private consulting room and out of the public Courts of Justice is a convenient
and expedient belief, because it helps him to feel - and indeed to be - doubly
"in." He becomes the in professional analyst who debunks the pretensions of
the power seekers, and the in intellectual who strikes a ringing blow on the
Liberty Bell. Much of what he has to say about Psychiatry and the Law is
worth reading and pondering. But just as the threat to American civil liberty
remains more complex, so do the foundations of clinical psychiatry remain
wider and more solid than this brave but biased exposition can either recognize
or reveal.
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